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Introduction 
 
The political and academic discourse(s) of whether, or not, the European Union (EU) can 
be understood as a form of empire are, first, controversial and, second, encounter widely 
indignant disapproval by those who those who ‘like’ the EU and by orthodox EU 
scholarship. From such perspectives, the EU is understood as a ‘normative’, i.e., good, 
power that spreads and conducts politics guided by human rights, democracy, and free 
markets, while ‘empire’ is understood as something evil, martial, and aggressive 
(amongst others, Manners, 2002; Telo, 2006; Whitman, 1998). This, somewhat 
simplified, dichotomy is in desperate need of clarification; and in this clarification exists 
the approach of this book and its attempt to assemble some of the most important 
contributors to the first wave of the ‘EU-as-empire-discourse’ to revisit their arguments 
after some 10 years.  
In order to summarise the main features of this discourse, now and then: in the 
context of the 2004 Eastern enlargement, the question arose among some political 
scientists, historians, and sociologists of whether the EU is indeed something ‘sui 
generis’ as the orthodox political and academic discourse widely held (see for the first, 
the first wave of ‘EU-as-empire-discourse’, for instance: Behr, 2007; Boeroecz, 2001; 
Diez, 1999; Engelbrekt, 2002; Hansen, 2002; Kovacs, 2001; Waever, 1997; 
Beck/Grande, 2007; Zielonka, 2006, Philipson, 2002; for the latter, see for example: 
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Phelan, 2012; Eichengreen, 2008). This questioning of the ‘sui generis’-argument 
initiated comparative perspectives into European and global history that resulted in 
mainly the three observations of (1) politics of conditionality by the EU (Stivachtis, 2008; 
Grabbe, 2002; Schimmelpfennig, 2004; Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003), (2) a geopolitical 
centre-periphery model in the EU characterized by asymmetric relations of wealth, 
power, and rights (Bartolini, 2005; Tunander et al., 1997; Copus, 2001; Behr, 2007), and 
(3) a discourse of and on European civilization in relation to the EU as global actor 
(Mitzen, 2006; European Commission 2014; Merlingen, 2007). Politics of conditionality, 
geopolitics of centre-periphery, and civilizational discourse resemble historically, 
whether one likes or not, features that are likewise evinced by what is non-controversially 
termed empire (historically see Benton, 2002; Eisenstadt, 1963; Sinopoli, 1994). Thus, 
the question seems to be indeed not whether the EU shows indicators that are (historically 
also) typical for empire, but, first, what kind of empire is the EU and, second, what at all 
is empire more fully and conceptually understood. The chapters collected here, approach 
and provide different perspectives and answers to these two questions. In doing so, and in 
having done so some 10 years ago in first attempts, these undertakings stem not from 
some dislike of the EU, but rather from disquiet and some dissatisfaction with the Union, 
carried by the wish to guard and rescue a worthwhile idea of supranational order. The 
‘EU-as-empire-discourse’ was thus born from empathy (but concern) with the Union and 
was looking beyond approaches as they are established in orthodox EU scholarship but 
well established in other social sciences (such as discourse analysis, iconographic 
analysis, historiographical analysis, linguistic analysis, etc.).  
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One more observation may be added here that is, too, addressed in some of the 
following chapters: as this book and its chapters are written in the context and under the 
influences of modern, present-day language structures and semantics (in this case, 
English), they all suffer from one particular shortcoming in relation to their 
epistemologies as epistemology is influenced by language and by semantically generated 
and (re)inforced perceptions (on the relation between language and epistemology, see 
Shapiro, 1992; Marcuse, 1964; Chomsky, 1968; Danto, 1969; Nagel, 1969). This 
epistemological limitation determines the above mentioned disapproval of the ‘EU-as-
empire-discourse’ by orthodox EU scholarship and politics. To be more precise: there 
was some igniting thought in José Manuel Baroso when he labeled the EU a ‘non-
imperial empire’, but unfortunately he backpedaled very quickly. However, the idea he 
came from was correct. What we are talking about here, relates to a widely held and 
linguistically reasoned incapability to think of ‘empire’ other than as something 
aggressive, evil, and martial. This limitation is due to an age-long process of narrowing 
down the width that was comprised by the Latin ‘imperium’ that stands at the roots of our 
English ‘empire’. This process of narrowing-down has resulted in that we nowadays do 
not even have an adjective of ‘empire’ other than ‘imperial’ which inevitably sounds like, 
and is historically linked with, Chinese, Ottoman, British, Spanish, etc. expansion and 
18th and 19th century warfare. ‘Empire’ thus appears as a political order that we cannot 
talk about other than dismissively. One aspect of the ‘EU-as-empire-discourse’ is hence 
to (re)open our imagination and to (re)gain a language that is more appropriate to 
empirical features and political experience rather than normatively pejorative (however, 
probably without being aware of it).  
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Such a more appropriate language, and subsequently political imagination and 
approaches, have not only to take into account the width of Latin ‘imperium’ (see 
Champion, 2004; Erskine, 2010; Folz, 1969; Foster, 2015), but further to this the 
Ciceronian twin concept of ‘patrocinium’ (see for Cicero his De re publica, De officiis 
and De legibus). Without delving here on linguistic nuances and genealogies, it might 
suffice to briefly mention the breadth of both ‘imperium’ and ‘patrocinium’ (for the latter 
we even have no noun in modern European English) in order to see what we as moderns 
have lost in terms of political imagination (why most of us are inclined to construe 
‘empire’ – as the word we are left with – inevitably as something ‘bad’). Both the Latin 
nouns of ‘imperium’ and ‘patrocinium’ encompass meanings such as ‘order’, ‘power’, 
‘authority’, ‘government’, ‘rule’, ‘mandate’, ‘tenure’, ‘patronage’, ‘responsibility’, and 
‘protectorate’. Mentioning this, does not necessarily intend to promote the argument that 
‘empire’ would be something ‘good’, but rather that it is a valuable analytical concept for 
the study of contemporary politics that is not to be dismissed due to normative likes and 
dislikes that appear indeed to be caused by language/epistemological limitations.  
 
 
The Empire Discourse 
The empire discourse is primarily related to the role of the United States in post- World 
War II international affairs and especially the U.S. international status following the end 
of the Cold War. However, the EU’s eastward enlargement and its efforts to play a more 
active role in world affairs in the post-Cold War era has brought the empire discourse 
into EU studies. In this respect, the debate has been about the nature of EU power and its 
strategy to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. 
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The United States as ‘Empire’ 
The modern, 20th and 21st century discourse on empire initially gained prominence in 
relation to the U.S. involvement in world politics. Specifically, the idea of the U.S as an 
empire emerged after the end of WWII as the United States and the Soviet Union quickly 
became superpowers. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. became the world’s only 
superpower, with its military posts around the world declaring to provide security for 
allies and operating as it wished without constraints of other powers. Its hegemony 
encouraged the U.S. to act like an empire, imposing its views and constituting security 
cordons around the world (Craig 2004). In addition, it has been claimed that the U.S. 
engaged in new imperialist ventures not only militarily but also economically. 
Consequently, it has been argued that the U.S. is the sole example of geopolitical 
hegemony since the fall of the Roman Empire in that it can set conditions for peace and 
security of the world, has predominance in world economy, and manages security 
organizations, such as NATO (O’Brien and Clesse 2002). 
Characterizing some aspects of U.S. foreign policy and international behavior as 
‘American empire’ is controversial but not uncommon. Chalmers Johnson (2000) posits 
that the idea of American exceptionalism impairs popular recognition of American 
imperial conduct since it has governed other countries via surrogates. These surrogates 
were domestically weak, right wing governments that would collapse without American 
support. Sidney Lens and Howard Zinn (2003) have argued that from its inception, the 
U.S. has used every means available to dominate other nations. Niall Ferguson (2003 and 
2004) argues that in both military and economic terms, the U.S. is nothing short of the 
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most powerful empire in history. Indeed, as Christopher Gray points out, the U.S. has 
about 5 per cent of the world’s population but spends almost 50 per cent of all military 
budgets (Gray 2003, 7). For the moment, there is no credible counterbalancing power or 
combination of powers that can match it. The U.S. military divides the world into 
geographical commands that extend across various world regions and the U.S. military 
circles the globe with permanent military bases and weapons caches. It is worth noting 
that even before the occupation of Iraq, the U.S. had over 750 military bases in more than 
130 countries and this number may be greater today (Gray 2003, 7).  
However, as Robert Jackson and Philip Towle (2006, 22) indicate, Americans tend to 
regard themselves as reluctant imperialists. Although their presidents have not hesitated 
to pronounce global ambitions and enact policies of extraterritorial significance, the fact 
remains that for the Americans the U.S. is not an empire and if by some chance it is, then, 
it is one of a kind. Some contend that empire status is vital to prevent evil (terrorism and 
tyranny) in the world (Simes 2003). As such they contend that the American empire is 
benevolent and their only fear is that it may become weak, overstretched or collapse. For 
example, Ferguson believes that the U.S. has an unparalleled ability and opportunity to 
take the role of positive global leadership and shape the world around its values of free 
markets, the rule of law, and representative government (Ferguson 2004). He argues that 
the U.S. is a ‘liberal’ form of empire, which can benefit all peoples by enhancing 
prosperity and democracy, and by creating a kind of benevolent, negotiated global order 
upholding the rules of international law and coercing deviants with military power. In 
other words, Ferguson believes that the current international order needs America’s 
enlightened leadership. Robert Kaplan (2005) also adopts the positive empire thesis and 
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emphasizes the role that the U.S. troops play in carrying American foreign policy on 
almost every continent. Michael Mandelbaum does not utilize the concept of ‘empire’ but 
he argues that he contends that the U.S. is indispensable as a benign world government 
(Mandelbaum 2005). For Mandelbaum, the U.S. provides world government through 
world-wide military deployments and rules for the global economy. 
Some critical scholars, such as Michael Mann and Benjamin Barber take these 
arguments about the U.S. as empire further. They share the view that any empire built on 
military domination will eventually fail (Mann 2003; Barber 2003). Andrew Bacevich 
has also argued that the U.S. constitutes an ‘informal’ empire, not colonial in policy, but 
still richly equipped with imperial paraphernalia such as troops, ships, planes, bases, 
proconsuls, and local collaborators (Bacevich 2002) and has attacked the seduction of 
America into military adventures (Bacevich, 2005). Following the same line of 
argumentation, Chalmers Johnson (2000 and 2004) suggests that the American empire is 
not liberal but military. In his 2000 book, Johnson predicted that U.S. interventionism 
abroad would create the climate for catastrophic terrorist attacks at home, while in his 
2004 book he warned that the rampant militarism could spell the end of American 
constitutional democracy. His argument stems from the notion that U.S. foreign policy 
revolves around a seemingly endless quest to accumulate military bases overseas. 
Military power has consolidated these bases in a new form of global and imperial rule. 
Johnson claims that because threats to homeland security are usually exaggerated, not 
only the U.S. becomes more and more militarized but also the department of Defense far 
exceeds the Department of State in terms of influence. Consequently, regional military 
commanders have more power than ambassadors and their influence is growing as they 
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oversee private military companies whom the U.S. both arms and trains to defend the 
interests of the American empire. Johnson holds that the large defense budget and the 
massive troop deployments overseas starve domestic needs in order to feed the colonial 
machine. Johnson concludes that 9/11 provided the U.S. with an excuse to expand the 
U.S. military, to abandon its alliance partners, treaties and laws, and to launch its imperial 
rule. 
David Harvey (2003) argues that although the U.S. does not fit the old model of an 
imperial nation, it nonetheless has shown such predilections for some time. Harvey cites 
the U.S’s ruthlessness in pressing global hegemony since the 1800s, including the 
internment of Japanese in World War II and the recent Patriot and Homeland Security 
Acts. He examines the symbiotic and parasitic relationship between Wall Street, the U.S. 
Treasury, and the International Monetary Fund as he explores how the U.S. has used an 
array of tactics, from trade embargoes to military force, to gain geopolitical influence. 
Finally, critics of the U.S. as empire focus on the negative aspects of a colossus 
determined and able to get its way in the world (Simes 2003; Todd 2003).  
 
The European Union as ‘Empire’ 
There is a general consensus that the EU represents a new kind of power in international 
politics (Diez 2005; Manners 2002; Whitman 1998) and that it plays an ever increasing 
role in world affairs (Elgstrom and Smith 2006; Orbie 2008). The increasingly important 
role of the EU in world affairs is reflected in the development of the European Foreign 
and Security Policy (EFSP) (Kirchner and Sperling 2007). The range of instruments at 
the EU’s disposal continues to increase in size and scope. The use of these instruments is 
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guided by the ambitious objectives set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS) that 
was adopted in December of 2003 and which for the first time established principles and 
set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based on the EU’s core 
values. The “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy” that was 
presented in December of 2008 reinforced the 2003 European Security Strategy (EC 
2008, 1).  
 
European Union’s Conceptualization of Global Order 
On the 12th of October of 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. José Manuel 
Barroso, President of the European Commission, and Herman Van Rompuy, President of 
the European Council, jointly offered a press release following acceptance of the award, 
asserting that “…over the last sixty years, the European Union has reunified a continent 
split by the Cold War around values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.” The presidents explicitly 
illustrated the EU’s conceptualization of global order as they elaborated: “…these are 
also the values that the European Union promotes to make the world a better place for all. 
The European Union will continue to promote peace and security in the countries close to 
us and the world at large” (EC 2012b). In other words, the EU has sought to 
conceptualize global order in terms of the spread and adoption of its own values and 
norms. 
However, it has not been until the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 that the EU specified its 
foreign policy objectives, which included, among other things the promotion of 
democracy and the rule of law and human rights. The Draft Constitutional Treaty 
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proclaimed that the EU’s policies should aim at “…preserving peace, preventing conflicts 
and strengthening international security” and that in doing so, the EU would be guided by 
the principles that inspired its own creation and evolution and which are rooted in 
traditions of “democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law” 
(Tocci 2007, 7). These principles were reaffirmed in the Lisbon Treaty.  
In 2003 then, the EU published its ‘Security Strategy,’ which was slightly revised and 
updated in 2008. In these documents, the EU identified threats to international peace and 
security and indicated the ways in which it sought to address these threats. Examining the 
ESS, one can easily observe that the EU has taken a comprehensive approach to security 
where “the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (EES 2003, 
2) and where security is regarded as a precondition of development (ESS 2003, 2). 
According to the ESS, the EU perceives non-domestic threats in two overarching forms. 
Menaces stemming from states in the EU’s immediate and nearby neighborhood are seen 
as peripheral threats, while the second class of threats is much broader, emerging from 
states outside of the EU’s neighborhood area.  
One of the most significant security threats identified in the ESS is bad governance - 
reflected in corruption, abuse of power, weak or collapsed institutions and lack of 
accountability (ESS 2003, 4). Therefore, spreading good governance, supporting social 
and political reform, dealing with corruption and the abuse of power, establishing rule of 
law and protecting human rights are viewed by the EU as the best means for increasing 
European security. Because state failure is assumed to lead to organized crime and/or 
terrorism, the EU uses a variety of tools, including political and economic conditionality, 
to ensure the establishment of well-governed democratic states.  
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The two fundamental pillars of the ESS are: building security in the EU’s 
neighborhood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism 
(ESS 2003, 9). The EU’s security strategy is rather explicit in defining the neighborhood 
“as a key geographical priority of EU external action…” (ESS 2003, 9).  Nathalie Tocci 
draws attention to the fact that the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is 
unequivocally directed at promoting the EU’s values “as a means to spread stability, 
security and prosperity in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods … and to strengthen 
the EU’s contribution to the solution of regional conflicts.” (Tocci 2007, 7). 
The development of well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
international order are identified as fundamental EU objectives. However, ‘effective 
multilateralism’ is to be based on a set of principles, values and norms that reflect those 
of the European Union. For example, the ESS notes that “the quality of international 
society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation” (ESS 2003, 
10). As a result, the best protection for EU’s security is a world of well-governed 
democratic states. Trade and development policies are seen as powerful tools for 
promoting democratic reforms. Contributing to better governance through assistance 
programs, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in 
EU’s policy. 
But what kind of capabilities are available to the EU to achieve these objectives? This 
discussion is associated with the question of the EU’s identity as a ‘civilian’, ‘military’, 
and ‘normative power’. 
The idea that the EU could become a power that does not rely primarily on military 
but on civilian means was first formulated by Francois Duchene (1973). ‘Civilian power’ 
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has been defined as involving three key features: the centrality of economic power to 
achieve political goals; the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international 
problems; and the willingness to use legally binding supranational institutions to achieve 
international progress (Twitchett 1976, 1-2). However, the linkage between the EU as 
‘empire’ and EU as a ‘civilian power’ is better reflected in Hans Maull’s definition of a 
civilian power as a state “…whose conception of its foreign policy role and behavior is 
bound to particular aims, values, principles, as well as forms of influence and instruments 
of power in the name of a civilization of international relations” (Maull 1990, 92-3).   
On 9 May 2000, to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, the 
EU distributed publicity material entitled “50 Years of Solidarity, Prosperity and Peace.” 
According to this material, the EU saw itself as representing a ‘civilian power’. The 
status of the EU as a global civilian power was also pronounced by Romano Prodi (2000, 
3) who stated that “We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of 
sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global 
development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security.” However, the inability of 
the EU to deal with the Yugoslav crisis made several scholars and practitioners argue 
about the need of the EU to develop and deploy its military power to achieve its foreign 
and security policy goals. 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in 1991, signaled the intent of the EU 
Member States to move beyond a ‘civilian power Europe’ and to develop a defense 
dimension to the international identity of the Union (Whitman 1998, 135-6). According 
to Ian Manners (2002, 237), the move from the single structure of the EC to the three-
pillar structure of the EU was part of a “fundamental shift from civilian to military power, 
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assuming that the development of a common foreign and security policy was eventually 
to include defense policy.”  
The trend towards ‘military power Europe’ can most clearly be found in the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) agreed upon at the June 1999 Cologne European 
Council which committed the EU to having a 60,000-person rapid reaction force (RRF) 
(Stivachtis 2004 and 2005). With the Treaty of Lisbon, ESDP came under the auspices of 
EFSP. This militarization of the EU that has been highlighted by the Union’s 
involvement in a number of international military operations is not without criticism. For 
example, it has been argued that it weakens the EU’s ‘distinct profile’ of having a civilian 
international identity (Zielonka 1998, 229) or that it promotes an image of the EU as a 
potential hegemonic and imperial power. However, according to Manners (2002), a better 
understanding of the EU’s role in world politics might be gained by reflecting on its 
normative power.  
Richard Rosecrance (1998, 22) has argued that “Europe’s attainment is normative 
rather than empirical” and that “it is perhaps a paradox to note that the continent which 
once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to 
set world standards in normative terms.” Elements of this normative power can also be 
found in the critical perspective of Johann Galtung, who argues that ideological power is 
“powerful because the power sender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-
recipient’ through the media of culture” (Galtung 1973, 33).  
Manners sought to illustrate that the EU should be best conceived as a ‘normative 
power Europe’. His effort begins by briefly surveying the conceptual history of ‘civilian 
power’ and ‘military power Europe’ since the early 1980s in order to locate these 
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traditional conceptions of the EU’s international role. He then introduces the idea of 
‘normative power Europe,’ discussing the EU’s normative difference and normative basis 
and explaining how EU norms are diffused. He concludes that the concept of ‘normative 
power’ represents a valuable addition to one’s own understanding of the EU’s civilian 
and military power in world politics.  
Manners’ empirical evidence that the EU is a normative power relies largely on the 
policies it pursues. Specifically, investigating the EU’s normative basis, Manners argues 
that unlike what happened with historical empires and contemporary global powers, the 
EU’s normative difference comes from its historical context, hybrid polity and political-
legal constitution (Manners 2002, 240). In the post-cold war period, this combination has 
accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the center of its 
relations with its Member States (Merlingen et al. 2001) and the world (Clapham 1999). 
Manners argues that the EU has gone further towards making its external relations 
informed by, and conditional on, a catalogue of norms which come closer to those of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR) than most other actors in world politics 
(Manners 2002, 241).  
The discursive construction of the EU as a normative power is one that most EU 
politicians and technocrats engage. As Thomas Diez puts it, “…there may well be 
disagreement about the development of the EU’s military capacities between Council and 
Commission, and between different member states and different directorate-generals, yet 
the representation of Europe as a force for peace and well-being is nearly consensual” 
(Diez 2005, 619). According to Diez (2005, 314) debates about the character of EU’s 
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identity as a global actor ignore or underestimate the ‘power’ that lies in the 
representation of the EU as a ‘normative power.’ He notes that not only is the success of 
this representation a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU, 
but it also constructs an identity of the EU against an image of ‘Others’ in the ‘outside 
world’. Diez argues that this has important implications for the way EU policies treat 
those ‘Others’, and the degree to which its adherence to its own norms is scrutinized 
within the European Union. In this sense, the discourse of the EU as a normative power 
constructs a particular self of the EU, while it attempts to change others through the 
spread of its own particular norms. 
Diez suggests that normative power connotes the characteristic of a Weberian type of 
power relationship (as A being able to make B do what s/he would otherwise not have 
done). This relationship, according to Diez, takes on a ‘Lukesian twist in the form of a 
kind of hegemonic power’, namely the power to shape the values of others (Diez 2005, 
614). In addition, normative power refers to particular ‘means’. In other words, it is not a 
power that relies on military force, but a power in which norms in themselves achieve 
what otherwise is done by military arsenals or economic incentives (Diez 2005, 614).  
This does not mean that normative power cannot go alongside other forms of power 
in international relations, notably military and economic forms (Diez 2005, 615). Indeed, 
the latter two may underpin normative power, although normative power must not be 
reduced to economic or military power if it is to make sense as a separate category. For 
instance, as Diez has put it, the EU is most likely to ‘shape conceptions of the normal’ 
(and therefore have greater normative power) in the context of EU membership 
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candidacies, when the interest to join the EU can be assumed to be an important factor 
determining the impact of EU norms (Diez 2005, 615). 
Diez correctly points out that normative power is not the opposite of military power 
(Diez 2005, 620). Helene Sjursen has also emphasised that it is entirely conceivable that 
military force is used to back up the spread of civilian values, partly because the 
application of civilian means would imply the pre-existing institutionalization of civilian 
values in order to be effective (Sjursen 2004, 122). Yet the more normative power builds 
on military force, the less it becomes distinguishable from traditional forms of power, 
because it no longer relies on the power of norms itself. Indeed, the imposition of norms 
through military force cannot be equated with successfully changing others, which relies 
primarily on socialization processes. 
It is in this context that a comparison is drawn between the U.S. and the EU as 
‘empires’. According to Diez (2005, 621), it is necessary to consider the long-established 
assessment of U.S. foreign policy as strongly influenced by the frontier-myth, resulting in 
the ‘Godgiven duty to spread the dream and promise of America beyond its own shores’; 
a predisposition that, as Michael Cox notes, ‘inevitably infused American foreign policy 
with a particularly moralistic and idealistic tone’ (Cox 2003, 238). The U.S.’ normative 
power was, for example, very visible during Woodrow Wilson’s presidency and in his 
‘Fourteen Points’. Also after World War II, when one could already see the dominance of 
military power and American hegemony in play, the U.S. helped to create a series of 
international institutions that would ‘civilize’ international politics. 
Diez rightly points out that even the invasion of Iraq cannot easily be dismissed as 
mere power politics as it was driven by a particular worldview with strong ideas of how 
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democracy should work within a particular liberal governmental frame (Diez 2005, 622). 
Yet, interests and norms cannot easily be separated (Cox 2003, 239). Building up 
institutions after the World War II was a projection of American norms, just as much as it 
safeguarded American interests. This was due to the fact that those norms were supposed 
to spread a conception of life that would match that of the U.S. to build a ‘community of 
ideals, interests and purposes’ (Diez 2005, 622). 
Diez, however, identifies one important difference between the EU and the US, 
namely that unlike the EU, the U.S. has sought to project, and often impose, its own 
norms while refusing to bind itself to international treaties (2005, 622). The difference 
between the U.S. and the EU in this respect should be understood not as a distinction 
between a normative and a traditional military power, but rather as a warning sign about a 
normative power in which military power is becoming increasingly important. 
Today, the EU faces a situation similar to the one that the U.S. was facing during the 
first part of the twentieth century.  Back then, the U.S. was not at all eager to intervene in 
conflicts outside its own hemisphere. President Wilson’s aim was to spread peace 
throughout the world so that interventions would no longer be necessary. The idea was to 
do so not with military means, but with binding normative commitments. Yet over time, 
the military back up of this normative power came to be of ever-increasing importance. 
And even though the U.S.’ reluctance to entertain imperial ambitions should not be 
overestimated this supplementation of norms with force was not solely due to imperial 
ambitions on the part of the United States. It was partly a response to international calls 
for U.S. involvement and engagement. 
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Currently, the EU is facing similar calls both for acquiring more military power and 
for using military force to achieve certain goals. In the case of the U.S., the entanglement 
of normative and military power is underpinned by a belief in the universal validity of its 
own norms and a missionary zeal to spread these norms to other places. But similar 
discourses have now been adopted by European politicians and EU officials. The ESS 
makes it clear that a peaceful and stable global order requires the creation of democratic 
states and the spread of European values and norms across the globe. It is such an 
unreflective normative stance that legitimizes the use of military force and thus 
emphasises the imperial nature of EU policies. 
 
Book Structure 
The present volume begins with Georgeta Pourchot’s chapter challenging the basic 
premises of the argument advanced in this book. According to Pourchot, ‘EU-as-empire-
scholarship’ insufficiently addresses traditional conceptual elements of empires such as 
conquest, coercion, pillaging, and hierarchy. As a result, a partial – and negative - image 
of the state of the EU as empire would emerge from such scholarship which would, 
according to Pourchot, benefit from more historically contextualized accounts of the 
drivers of enlargement, the sustainability elements of enlargement, and the modern types 
of hierarchy arising from post-communist states’ accession to the European Union. 
In response to traditional conceptualizations of ‘empire’, such as the one advanced by 
Pourchot, Hartmut Behr’s paper engages a relation between two contested and complex 
concepts, those of ‘empire’ and ‘governing from the distance’. In his chapter, Behr first 
goes back to the Latin term of ‘imperium’ and explores its manifold meanings of which 
19 
 
the English ‘empire’ appears to be a narrowed-down imagination over centuries of 
linguistic and political controversies. He then employs a historiographical approach that 
suggests a feature of ‘imperium’ which appears to have survived in contemporary politics 
and which serves as a tool to identify ‘empire'/'imperium’ in our times. This feature can 
be captured by the imaginary for - what Behr calls – ‘governing from a distance’ and thus 
draws on Edward Said and Michel Foucault, at the same time linking them back to the 
Latin richness of ‘imperium’ and the question of instruments of governing. It is within 
this context that the EU, according to Behr, can be seen as representing a contemporary 
form of empire. 
Another feature of contemporary empire is suggested by Jan Zielonka. According to 
Zielonka, empire represents a type of political organization in which the metropolis 
exercises control over diverse peripheral actors through formal annexations and/or 
various forms of informal domination. Although at first sight it seems that the EU cannot 
be classified as empire, Zielonka argues that the EU represents a vast territorial unit with 
sizeable power and resources and which often imposes severe domestic constraints on 
formally sovereign actors, including its own member states. Like all empires, the EU 
would also have a civilizing narrative, if not a civilizing mission since it claims to be an 
indispensable agent of modernity and peace in Europe and beyond. Zielonka’s chapter 
not only demonstrates how the EU looks, walks, and talks as empires do, but, too, 
examines the implications of this phenomenon for the evolving nature of European 
politics. 
In his chapter on the EU as empire in the 21st century, József Böröcz adopts a 
historical-sociological approach and argues that West European societies have played a 
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central, and exceptionally privileged, part in the history global capitalism. According to 
Böröcz’s analysis, some of the geopolitical and economic foundations of that centrality 
and privilege have recently begun to show powerful signs of erosion. His contribution 
regards the supra-state and the public authority of the European Union as an instrument 
of a strategic coalition among west and central European capital, state apparatuses and 
populations, aiming to optimize their geopolitical position under present-day conditions. 
The key instrument of this new global adjustment would bear a clear resemblance to the 
asymmetrical linkages that constituted the geopolitics of power of empires throughout 
much of global history. In light of this framework, Böröcz further examines how 
membership and association agreements work as “enforcement chains”. 
Aligning with the logic of Böröcz’s chapter, Yannis Stivachtis seeks to re-examine 
the concept of ‘empire’ and demonstrates its application to the case of the European 
Union. It begins with the acknowledgement that the majority of scholars and practitioners 
have been very reluctant to consider the EU as an empire mainly due to the lack of 
aggressive imperial and expansionist tendencies that are historically associated with 
empires. However, the paper argues that the process of the creation and expansion of an 
empire has not been historically uniform and that the establishment of an empire can take 
different forms in the presence of ‘international anarchy’. Stivachtis claims that 
sometimes empires may represent the end result of aggressive imperial tendencies and, at 
other times, be ‘just’ the outcome of a more peaceful process of international 
cooperation. To this end, he focuses on the EU’s policy of conditionality and its 
application to the Union’s enlargement, neighbourhood, and development policies to 
demonstrate how they have all served to create a ‘non-imperial empire.’ 
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Resonating with important aspects raised by Stivachtis, Aylin Güney’s study analyzes 
competing and converging geopolitical imaginations of Europe and their impact on 
European Union enlargement politics. Güney’s paper first presents the analytical tools of 
critical geopolitics to understand how geopolitical identities may eventually be translated 
into EU’s enlargement policies, especially towards Central and Eastern European 
countries and Turkey. The study then explains two different geopolitical identifications 
that stand behind two the conceptualizations of Europe of ‘Europe as neo-Westphalian 
state’ and ‘Europe as neo-Medieval Empire’. The chapter then continues to analyse the 
effect of these competing and/or converging geopolitical identifications on the formation 
of Europe’s geopolitical discourses and examines how this imagination has been 
translated into policies of inclusion and exclusion within European Union enlargement 
schemes. 
Portraying the EU as torn between imperial and non-imperial features, Kalypso 
Nicolaidis and Nora Fisher Onar argue in their chapter that the EU suffers from a ‘post-
imperial’ condition that has problematic consequences for its internal and external 
policies. They point out that different and multiple meanings of the ‘imperial past’ prevail 
in countries in east and central Europe, southern or northern Europe as well as in former 
European colonies which see the EU through the lens of their postcolonial status. It is the 
confrontation between these imperial legacies and the difficulty to transcend them by 
recognizing then and now the critical role of ‘others’ in the constitution of the EU project 
which forge Europe’s imperial condition. They suggest that while the EU has made much 
formal and indeed substantial progress toward confronting echoes of imperialism, 
imperial patterns die hard. Moreover, they claim that many of the symbolic and effective 
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types of oppression, which they unveiled and fought, still exist. But the echoes are fainter 
and more confusing than in immediately postcolonial times; for example, power is more 
diffuse and hybridity more pervasive. This would result in policies that are 
counterproductive to the EU’s interests, not least in its relations with Turkey and its 
Eastern neighbours.  
Robert Phillipson’s chapter examines the relationship between language and global 
order. The myth of ‘terra nullius’, Philipson contends, has been succeeded by an 
expansion of the cultural universe of the USA (as a ‘cultura nullius’) and English. He 
argues that English is fraudulently marketed as a ‘lingua nullius’ although it serves all 
equally well. Nevertheless, this would constitute a linguistic imperialism that, too, 
permeates EU institutional activities. In this context, globalisation and global English are 
seen as interlocking projects. Philipson points to the role of the European Court of Justice 
in advancing European integration and neoliberalism, demonstrating how European 
Commission initiatives, like the Bologna process, strengthen English in continental 
Europe. Philipson arrives at two main conclusions: first, that this authoritarian executive 
managerialism is undemocratic; and second, loose reference to English as a ‘lingua 
franca’ in political and academic discourse conceals the role of English as the neo-
imperial language of the transnational global corporate class made up by the power 
complex of the US-NATO-EU. 
Another historiographical and genealogical perspective is offered by Russell Foster 
who points out that ‘empire’ as a political term would not refer to a taxonomy of state 
power, but to a claim of a political unit as the solely legitimate and superior order of the 
world. Therefore, Foster argues, ‘empire’ is a normative and exclusionary discourse of 
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sovereignty, legitimacy, duty, and manifest destiny. This would be most effectively 
conveyed through the coded language of symbols. Foster considers symbols to be the 
most powerful form of communication acting as a social solvent, encoding everyday life 
with the presence of a political ideology. However, Foster’s chapter demonstrates that the 
EU’s symbols express not only what the Union is, but most importantly what it should 
be, namely a political order which blurs the EU and Europe into a single, imperial 
synecdoche. 
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